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Reviewed by Philip C. Jessupt
As these lines are published, it is the 50th anniversary of my
third year at the Yale Law School. There I studied international law
with Professor Edwin Borchard who, like Professor Eugene Rostow,
was a thorough analyst of the literature of foreign affairs; and who,
again like Professor Rostow, was a skilled advocate with experience
in government service and the prcticalities of international law and
politics. I began my first stint in the State Department when Pro-
fessor Rostow, at whose feet I now gladly sit, was eleven years old:
With the valor 6f youth, I was soon crossing swords with Professor
Borchard, particularly with regard to the law and policy of neu-
trality. Now, with the obstinacy of age, I find myself again having
to disagree with a Yale Law Professor, and a good friend, whose of-
ficial participation in conduct of United States foreign policy is much
more recent than my own. I do not feel competent to judge Profes-
sor Rostow's comments on the views of Kolko, Alperowitz and Chom-
sky; I feel somewhat more confident discussing certain of his inter-
pretations of history.
First, I must outline the structure of this impressive book. Pro-
fessor Rostow posits the urgent need for a "genuine debate about
the ends and means of foreign policy."' He hopes his book will stir
up such debate, stating as its theme:
the relationship of ideas and events affecting the possibility of
peace. In method it is both an analysis and a memoir.2
His memories of the Johnson Administration, where he was Un-
dersecretary of State for Political Affairs, enrich and enliven his
t- Judge of the International Court of Justice, 1961-1970; Ambassador-at-large, 1949.53;
Representative to the United Nations General Assembly, 1948-52.
1. E. Rosrow, PEAc N ThE Bi\LCRE: TuE FuruR oF Am c.ue Fo ac.N PoL CY 12
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analysis of eight schools of thought found in recent literature on
foreign policy.3 Although his own opinions shine through in all the
chapters, it is in the last three that he seeks to state the criteria he
finds lacking in many of the books and articles he discusses:
Few of those who write about foreign policy make their major
premises explicit and fewer still give reasons for their choice.4
Naturally, Professor Rostow defends the policies of the Johnson
Administration in which he served with distinction, and inevitably,
Vietnam emerges at almost every step. I understand his approach,
for as I attempt to write about the Truman Administration in which
I served, I find myself justifying its policies because I know what
our motives and objectives were at the time and am satisfied that
many of our critics are misinformed or misguided. But Professor
Rostow does not escape from the dilemma posed by the impetuous
chronology of international events: No one writing about contem-
porary foreign affairs can avoid the inevitability that the reader
will challenge his statements with events which occurred after the
book went to press.5 Moreover, as I shall suggest, generalizations
about men or nations valid in the context of one decade, may be
quite inappropriate to another, though the interval between them
be very short.
I have rather basic disagreements with two aspects of Professor
Rostow's thesis. First, he speaks of foreign "policy" in the singular,
while for me it is always inevitably pluralistic-probably hydra.headed
or at least Janus-faced in the sense of contrasting aspects. Second,
when he writes about "power" (as he does throughout) or "the bal-
ance of power," it does not seem to me that he takes into account
the many elements which constitute national power in this day and
age. I cannot agree that power should be conceived of as purely
military force; economic and moral strength may be equally im-
portant. Thus Japan and India have exercised power which has not
rested on armaments. I am not sure that Professor Rostow would
disagree with this point if the question were put to him directly,
because he does refer to such other elements. Still, the basic refrain
is always "Arma virumque cano." And when he writes of the Presi-
3. See pp. 79-258.
4. P. 79.
5. Rostow takes Senator Fulbright to task for not discussing "the effect of with.
drawal [from Vietnam] now on the policies of Japan and the nations of Southeast
Asia or on China and the Soviet Union." P. 186. But Rostow's conclusions will also
be judged by hindsight.
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dent, I keep feeling that he concentrates too much on the man and
his influence.
I for one would not identify the foreign policies of the Eisenhower
Administration with the President as much as with Secretary Dulles.
Rostow seems to underestimate Dulles' role in advancing the notion
of "liberating" Eastern Europe; yet I remember Dulles ranting about
Stalin in the corridors of the State Department before he was Sec-
retary, like a John Knox berating a Mary Queen of Scots. Thus,
Rostow dismisses Senator Fulbright's charge of a "global anticom-
munist crusade" but he marshals the evidence of the 1940's; he
stops short of the Dulles era. He tends to speak of SEATO as an Eis-
enhower agreement,7 yet it was clearly Dullesian. To be sure, it was
not "global," yet a directive from Secretary Acheson to me as Am-
bassador-at-Large in 1949 (in line with a National Security Council
paper) stated:
[I]t is a fundamental decision of American policy that the United
States does not intend to permit further extension of Communist
domination on the continent of Asia or in the southeast Asia area.
Still, the use of American troops on the Asian mainland or against
the Soviet Union was at that time clearly excluded.
I would also differ strongly with one of Rostow's historical assess-
ments: He contends that Truman's decision not to run again in 1952
may be equated with Johnson's in 1968, because the reason for both
was identification with an unpopular war. I do not agree that Truman
was forced out by Korea as Johnson was forced out by Vietnam. Nor
do I believe, as does Rostow, that that "[foreign policy wrecked
[Truman's] . . . career."8
II
I would agree with Rostow's praise of the era following Vienna
(1815),9 save that he disregards such aberrations as the Crimean,
Franco-Prussian and colonial wars and the utter contempt of the
major powers for the independence of the smaller states. Despite
this disregard, he replies affirmatively to the question "Does the
6. Pp. 180-81. See also p. 37.
7. Pp. 16-17.
8. P. 15. I am inclined to prefer the explanation suggested by Dean Acheson, that
President Truman decided to withdraw for personal reasons unrelated to foreign policy.
D. ACH. wN, PREsEr AT THE CREAmo, 632-33 (1969).
9. Pp. 31-34.
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Third World Matter?", 10 which entitles one of his chapters. Similarly,
I believe that Professor Rostow overstates American aloofness from
the League of Nations. While this aloofness was indeed stupid during
the Harding and Coolidge administrations, there was a difference
in the Hoover Administration once Secretary Stimson was forced to
realize that Japanese aggression against China had to be challenged
through or with the League (though the United States might insist
that the rules to be invoked were those of the Briand-Kellogg Pact
and not those of the Covenant). I think Rostow and I do share con-
victions on the value of the United Nations, although when he says
-correctly enough-that it "was not intended to function as a peace-
keeping agency when great powers are seriously divided,"" I would
recall the resort to the Security Council during the Berlin blockade
in 1948 and the central role of the United Nations in Korea.'
2
This brings me to a rather fundamental disagreement. Professor
Rostow maintains that in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam it was un-
derstood that the divisions created separate states and not merely
temporary demarcations within a single state.13 As for Germany,
this was simply not true, at least during the decade after the war
when we insisted that there was one Germany, part of which was oc-
cupied by the Russians. It was not until Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik
took the fore that the idea of admitting the existence of two separate
states was accepted by the West. Today the "two Germanies" have
reached agreement, and they will apply for separate membership in
the United Nations.
Korea was divided at the 38th parallel as a war-time agreement
connected with the surrender of the Japanese forces when the Russian
armies were close at hand and our available forces were off in Formosa
and the Philippines. Speaking for the United States in the Interim
Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on February 24, 1948, ad-
vocating elections in the South even if the U.N. Committee were
excluded from the North by the Russians, I emphasized our concept
of a single state of Korea; Canada, Australia, and others opposed
the elections out of fear they would hinder eventual union. Through
the war years, we never agreed that there were two separate Korean
states; and today the authorities in the North and South are affirm-
10. P. 239.
11. P. 48.
12. Rostow's explanation of Soviet action in ending the Berlin Blockade is inade-
quately made by a passing reference at p. 213; cf. Jessup, Park Avenue Diplomacy-
Ending the Berlin Blockade, 87 POL. Sci. Q. 377 (1972).
13. Pp. 187-88.
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ing their desire for unity on the same pattern we stressed in 1948.
But we did not promise either Germany or Korea "unity through
elections."14
In December, 1951, we supported a resolution of the United Na-
tions General Assembly "to secure the aid of the United Nations in
taking a necessary step toward the unification of Germany" with the
aid of a U.N. Commission to supervise elections, but the Soviets again
denied access to the territory they controlled, and we made no
"promises."
In Vietnam while the French were there, the West never recog-
nized that the northern areas controlled by Ho Chi Minh consti-
tuted a separate state. The Geneva arrangements of 1954, in drawing
a line, did not propose to create two separate states. All of this is of
real importance to Professor Rostow's analysis, since he, of course,
defends our policy in Vietnam, something I cannot do. According to
his theory of two separate states, Hanoi is clearly the "invader" of
the South and therefore the aggressor; thus, there is no basis for
calling the struggle a "civil war." I disagree and therefore cannot
accept his assertions on the rules of international law applicable dur-
ing civil strife. 5 The pros and cons of this argument have been de-
veloped elsewhere at such length that I do not intend to discuss them
further here. But I do wish to disagree with Rostow's reference (in
the Middle Eastern context) to the inadmissibility of territorial ac-
quisition by war "as a murky principle" of international law;10 it is,
in fact, as clear as crystal and basic to international law in this era.
Another troubling aspect of the Vietnamese war from a hard-boiled
view of the interests of the United States, is that we are daily reveal-
ing the relative impotence of the mightiest war machine in the world.
General George Marshall warned the Dutch, apropos Indonesia, that
a European army could never defeat a fervent nationalist movement
in the Asian jungles. The British proved the truth of that judgment
in Malaysia, where it was only Gurkha auxiliaries that finally brought
relative victory. Morals aside, what have we to show for the thousands
of tons of bombs which were supposed to prevent the North Viet-
namese from coming south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail? This futility,
coupled with what one may fairly call a global abhorrence of the
14. P. 187.
15. My own views are much closer to the thesis of Professor Richard Falk, although
I do not accept all of his argument. See, e.g., R. FAIr, LE, AL ORDER N A VoLE-r WonD
(1968), especially ch. 4.
16. P. 270; c. p. 272.
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brutality of the war-Mylai, Lavelle, and all-surely teaches a lesson
which, it seems to me, Professor Rostow does not include in his
course. As Hamilton Fish Armstrong has said,
The methods we have used in fighting this war have scandalized
and disgusted public opinion in almost all foreign countries.
Not since we withdrew into comfortable isolation in 1920 has
the prestige of the United States stood so low.'1
Reluctantly, I must also disagree with some aspects of Rostow's
analysis of the Middle Eastern strife between the Arabs and the Jews.
Unpopular as the conclusion is, I cannot escape the conviction that
our support of Israel has been much more a product of domestic po-
litical considerations than a dispassionate, objective appraisal of our
strategic interests. It was this domestic element which led President
Truman to grant precipitate recognition to the State of Israel over
the objections of Secretary Marshall and Undersecretary Lovett-a
move which was not even communicated to those of us carrying out
our instructions in the General Assembly, ignorant of what was being
told the rest of the world by the news ticker-tape. And I cannot agree
with Rostow's statement that,
Nominally, it [Israel] was established by a decision of the
United Nations, acting with regard to trust territories adminis-
tered under its authority:' 8
Palestine was not, inter alia, a "trust territory" and the United Na-
tions had no power of administration before the declaration of the
establishment of the Israeli state. The traditional bugaboo of the loss
of Near Eastern oil has been unmasked by the newly exploited re-
sources of Libya, the North Sea, Nigeria, Alaska, and other off-shore
drillings; but the possibility of such a loss clearly was a major fear
in the minds of those responsible and conscientious officials who, in
1948, warned against estranging the Arab world. As for the situation
in 1967, U Thant's action, which Rostow criticizes, 1 was inescapable
in view of the ultimata of the governments who supplied the forces
which were withdrawn.2
0
Of course, the Soviet Union has steadily sought to increase its
17. Armstrong, Isolated America, 51 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1-2 (1972).
18. P. 248.
19. P. 256.
20. I believe that this view was shared by Ralph Bunche, whose name, curiously
enough, appears nowhere in the book.
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power in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. In 1945, at a
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Molotov did say the
Soviet Union wished to be trustee for Tripolitania,2 one of the
three districts of Libya, but the claim was abandoned. The three
Western Allies succeeded in maintaining their grip on the former
Italian colonies until their future was decided by the General As-
sembly in accordance with the provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty.
III
It seems I have satisfied Professor Rostow's hope that this book
would stir up a debate, and since he has used both analysis and
ccmemoir" I have been led to do the same. But we have not yet
reached the point which is "the ends and means of foreign policy,"
a theme to which Rostow returns in his last two chapters.22
As noted above, Rostow first disposes of seven of his eight "schools"-
the pacifist, the Strangelovites, the communists, the isolationists, the
Wilsonian moralists, the realpolitiker, the devotees of world govern-
ment. He himself wears the old school tie of the eighth, which seeks
a system of peace in the world on the foundation of "an accepted
balance of power."23
I agree with Professor Rostow that "The vision of safety under
siege in Fortress America is a terrible illusion." -4 And I heartily
concur that "international peace, and its correlative principle of
not interfering in the internal affairs of other states-the two basic
principles of the United Nations Charter"" are worthy goals for
our foreign policy, satisfying the requirements of morality and ideal-
ism as well as our essential material interests. As I understand his
conclusions, we need to find a new "accepted" balance of power.
He argues that:
Under the circumstances of modem life, the path of wisdom and
prudence is that of stalemate, detente, and peaceful coexistence
under the rules of the United Nations Charter."
This is true especially since the nuclear weapon can be neither ig-
nored nor used.
21. Cf. p. 252.
22. Pp. 283-342.




The Yale Law Journal
While I agree, I am still puzzled as to how we attain a mutually
acceptable balance of power. Rostow properly points to the Soviet
policies of imperialist expansion which alarm us and which we seek
to counter; but our insistence on predominance must equally alarm
the Russians. In the early fifties we in the State Department, follow-
ing Dean Acheson, were insisting that we would not negotiate ex-
cept from a position of strength. I never could persuade the Secretary
or the Policy Planning Staff that we ought to draw up what we
would consider an acceptable program once that position of strength
was assured, though I do recollect that George Kennan had a similar
view.
Rostow agrees that the policy of "spheres of interest" has not worked.
It makes sense to say, as he does, that we need to transform our al-
liances and,
become in fact the junior partner in regional coalitions to assure
stability and development in areas of the Free World now threat-
ened with conquest or chaos. 27
This does not seem to me to be our present policy in Vietnam. I
think the New York Times was correct in saying that when President
Nixon compared himself to Disraeli pursuing a "strong foreign policy,"
Mr. Nixon forgets that the European ruling classes in the nine-
teenth century shared a common world view which made balance-
of-power diplomacy workable. There was an intellectual com-
munity of interest then that simply does not exist today between
Western statesmen and Chou En-Lai or Brezhnev and Kosygin.2 8
This is why Kissinger is out of date-a diplomatic Rip Van Winkle.
And I think Rostow agrees with the further point made by the Times
that today one must consider the wider community which works
day by day through the United Nations and its many agencies.
Rostow, in my opinion, underemphasizes the potentialities of a
United Europe.29 I am inclined toward a policy of admitted parity
between America and Europe, Russia, China, Japan and the Third
World. With the emergence to full statehood of the two Germanies
and-as I anticipate-a single Korea and Vietnam, the policy of ac-
commodation and detente could become a reality and the national
interest of the United States would be served.
27. E. Rosrow, LAw, PowER, AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 116 (1968), quoted pp. 384-35.
28. Editorial, The Nixon Interview, New York Times, Nov. 12, 1972, § 4, at 10, col. 1.
29. Cf. pp. 233, 235.
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Professor Ronald Syme of Oxford, writing of Ulpian, a Roman
jurist who attained high rank in government only to be slain, con-
dudes:
Such was the tragedy of Ulpian, scholar and minister of state ....
[A] philosophical mind... will evoke with complacency the gen-
der manners of present times . . . . In the United States, he is
permitted to revert to a law school or to the charge of some
opulent foundation.30
I view the restoration of Eugene Rostow to the legal realm of Aca-
deme, not just with complacency, but with unmitigated delight and
with the assurance that when we have a wiser national administration
he will be available for further public service in the national interest.
30. Syme, Lawyers in Government: The Case of Ulpian, 116 PRoc. Ams. Pnu.. Socu
409 (1972).
The Assault on Privacy. By Arthur R. Miller. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1971. Pp. xi, 333. $7.95
Databanks in a Free Society. By Alan F. Westin and Michael A. Baker.
New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972. Pp. xxi, 522. $12.50.
Reviewed by Charles Listert
There are fashions in the law, and no doctrine is now more fashion-
able than the right of privacy. Virtually any issue of political or per-
sonal liberty may, after sufficiently eager scrutiny, be styled a problem
of individual privacy. Abortion,' motorcycle helmets,2 homosexuality,3
t Member of the -Bar, District of Columbia. A.B. 19(0, Harvard University; B.A.
1962, B.C.L. 1963, M.A. 1965, Oxford University; LL.M. 1965, George Washington
University.
1. See, e.g., Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970); People v. Belous,
80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969).
2. See, e.g., People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969); American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. Ct. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968).
3. See, e.g., REPOrT OF TE CoMirrrEE o,4 HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROsnTz ON
(WoLDENN REPORT), CAMiN. No. 247 (1957); Note, Homosexuality and the Law, 17
N.Y.L.F. 273, 295-96 (1971).
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hair styles, 4 marijuana,5 psychological testing,G and sodomy: 7 All have,
with greater or lesser success, been brought beneath privacy's conven-
ient banner. Traces of the doctrine now have been fortuitously un-
earthed in the First,8 Fourth,9 Fifth,10 and even Ninth" Amendments.
Only seven years after Griswold,'2 privacy threatens to become a code
word for all freedom from governmental interference.
Given the doctrine's obscurity, it should hardly be surprising that
the literature of privacy is characteristically ephemeral. With isolated
exceptions, that literature adds little to our understanding of either
privacy or the situations in which it is thought to be endangered. From
the law journals, we have jejune philosophizing and tedious explora-
tions of the ambivalent opinions in Griswold. Monographs and non-
legal periodicals have typically proved no better. They have done little
more than fervently lament the wholesale destruction of privacy.
Although numerous villains have been identified, it is custom-
ary to point with particular dismay to the development of the
computer. If privacy is fashionable, it is haute couture to bewail the
iniquities of computerization. Professor Miller's book 3 is among the
most recent of these lamentations. With a single exception,' 4 it is un-
doubtedly the best of a bad lot. Its most important strength is that
Professor Miller has had the good sense to avoid the more extravagant
applications of the privacy doctrine, and to limit his inquiry to infor-
mation-gathering and record-keeping about individuals. Moreover, he
parades the usual horribles with more than ordinary elan. Computers
and those who employ them are flayed with a remarkable collection of
anecdotes, snippets of poetry, and technological lore. Most of the book
is highly readable, and all of it is written with obvious conviction. Not
4. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969); Comment, A
Student's Right to Govern His Personal Appearance, 17 J. oF Pun. L. 151 (1968).
5. See, e.g., Comment, The California Marijuana Possession Statute: An infringement
of the Right of Privacy or Other Peripheral Constitutional Rights?, 19 HASTINGS L.J.
758 (1968).
6. See, e.g., A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FR.OM 242-78 (1967).
7. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and
remanded, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
9. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
10. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 56-57 (1968); Griswold, Th
Right to be Let Alone, 55 N.W.U.L. Rzv. 216 (1960).
11. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. Id.
13. A. MILaE, THn ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971) [hereinafter cited as A. MiuLan,
PIAc Y].
14. A. WEmsIN, supra note 6.
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surprisingly, disciples in large numbers are apparently gathering round
him.15
Professor Miller's thesis is simple and familiar. He argues that new
information technologies-the principal features of what he styles the
"Age of Cybernetics"-are now dramatically altering "basic patterns in
our daily life."' 6 Miller assures us that as a result of computerization
more information is now being accumulated from and about more in-
dividuals, is being more extensively manipulated and analyzed, is more
often centrally collated and more rapidly and widely disseminated than
ever before. He perceives a "profound change" in public attitudes to-
ward information and the purposes for which it is used, and believes
that these changes involve "a potential or actual threat to personal
privacy.' 17
Despite the enthusiasm with which it has been greeted else-
where,'8 the book is largely disappointing. I share Professor Miller's
conviction that record-keeping and information-gathering about indi-
viduals warrant prompt and careful study, and had expected that his
book would make an important contribution. It has not. Many of the
issues in the book were treated with greater balance and perception by
Alan Westin five years ago.' 9 Popular books and magazines, congres-
sional hearings, and even presidential messages have already sounded
any necessary alarms.2 0 Professor Miller might have drawn together
the suggestions and proposals that have been made, assessed them rigor-
ously in light of information gathered during the past several years,
and formulated a sensible program of research and legislation. Such a
book is very much needed, and Professor Miller is one of the few men
prepared to write it.
Unfortunately, he has done little more than rehearse the usual warn-
ings about computerization and sundry other misfortunes, and al-
though he surveys the law of privacy, offering various proposals and
recommendations, aficionados of the literature will find little that is
15. See, e.g., Christie, The Right to Privacy and the Freedom to Know: A Comment
on Professor Miller's The Assault on Privacy, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 970 (1971).
16. A. MI.sR, PrvAcY at 1-2.
17. Id. at 5.
18: Christie, supra note 15.
19. A. WEsm, supra note 6.
20. See, e.g., M. BRFNco, THE PIVACY INVADERs (1964); E. LoNG, TIM l-nUDEns
(1967); J. ROSENBERG, THE DEArH oF PRVACY (1969); HoUsE CO Mu. O. Posr OmcF AND
CIVIL SERVICE, THE FEDERAL PAPERWORK JUNGLE, H.R. REP. No. 52, 89th Cong.. 1st Sas.
(1965); Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before the Subcommn. on Admin. Prac. and
Proc., Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966); Hearings on the Corn-
puter and Invasion of Privacy Before a Subcomm. of House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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new. The distressing fact is that the book does little to clarify, and
much to obscure, debate on the already muddled issue of computeri-
zation.
The book's principal defect is its failure to describe accurately the
relative significance of computerization. A reader could pardonably
conclude that record-keeping about individuals was conducted in so
gentlemanly a manner before the computer as to avoid all of the dan-
gers noted in the book. Implicit through much of it is the notion that
if we only come to grips with computerization, we shall have solved the
problems of record-keeping. The truth is quite different, as Professor
Miller is no doubt aware.21 The computer is, and doubtless will re-
main, only tangentially responsible for the critical issues of individual
record-keeping. Although they have until recently been largely ignored
by the law, 22 the important issues-what information should various in-
stitutions collect, under what conditions should collection be permit-
ted, how long should information be retained, with what other infor-
mation should it be combined, and to whom should it be disseminated
-are assuredly not problems peculiar to the "Age of Cybernetics."
Public school records are an excellent illustration. Professor Miller
devotes some sixteen pages to experimentation in computer-assisted in-
struction and the possible consequences of computerization for student
record-keeping.23 With characteristic elegance, he announces that "com-
puter-assisted instruction is becoming the 'in' thing in the Ed Biz. 22'
It is, Miller assures us, a matter of the "Little Red Schoolhouse" going
"Electronic. 26 The book argues that such instructional methods may
result in the creation of "dossiers containing information on all aspects
of a student's educational life."'26 Miller informs us that computer-
based record-keeping "is replacing manila folders, '2 7 asserting that this
may destroy something akin to a "confidential relationship" that "pres-
21. Professor Miller served as a member of the advisory committee of the data bank
study of the National Academy of Sciences, described below, in which the relative sig-
nificance of the computer was investigated. Traces of the report's more balanced posl-
tion now and again emerge in Assault on Privacy.
22. A careful summary of the lamentably inadequate law may be found in Goldstein,
Legal Control of the Dossier, in ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN SocILry
415 (S. Wheeler ed. 1969); and Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy
and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTE.IP. PROD. 342 (1966).
23. A. MILLER, PRIVACY at 105-22.
24. Id. at 110.
25. Id. at 105.
26. Id. at I11.
27. Id. at 108.
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ently exists" between "a student and his mentors."28 With uncharacter-
istic caution, he concedes that the existing threat to privacy may be
"remote," and that the "long-term ramifications of the computer" are
not "really perceptible." 29 He then speculates on the dangers that
might follow if comprehensive student records were circulated freely. 30
It would be difficult to imagine a less helpful summary. First, it is
simply not true that public school records have been computerized in
significant numbers. Given the severe limitations on school finances
and the caution with which computerization has proceeded elsewhere,
there is every reason to expect that this situation will not change rap-
idly. When it does change, the available evidence suggests that the in-
formation computerized is likely to be the most objective and least
intrusive.31 More important, Professor Miller evidently does not rec-
ognize the deficiencies of manual record-keeping as it now exists. The
record-keeping policies of the public schools have until recently been
typically haphazard, with wide variations in the character, quantity,
and intrusiveness of the information collected.32 It seems clear that
these differences have generally reflected, not reasoned distinctions
based on the particular activities and goals of different school systems,
but rather the ad hoc and even ad hominem judgments of thousands
of individual record-keepers. It seems equally clear that many public
schools already maintain relatively comprehensive records on the prog-
ress, difficulties, and aptitudes of their students. Professor Miller's
manila folders often contain remarkably intrusive information. 33 They
may include psychological and psychiatric reports, unsubstantiated or
false allegations concerning a student's behavior or capabilities, or
extensive information about the student's family or economic back-
ground. If improperly disseminated, such records may have severely
prejudicial consequences for a student's later academic career, as well
as for his relationships with the police, the military, potential em-
ployers, and others.
Nor are these records generally maintained in confidence. The best
available survey indicates that student records are widely available
28. Id. at 112.
29. Id. at 111.
50. Id. at 111-13.
31. A. IVEs-N & M. BAxER, DATABANrS IN A FR.m SocIETY 243-51 (1972).
52. See generally Goslin & Bordier, Recordheeping in Elementary and Secondary
Schools, in S. Wheeler, supra note 22, at 29.
38. See generally id.; C. Eucrso0, A PRACCAL RAsDflOOK FOR SCHOOL COUMsMLOMS
(1949).
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without prior consent to the police, the FBI, military investigators,
and many others.34 A congressional committee recently had not the
slightest qualms about printing for public dissemination extracts from
the records of identifiable students without student or parental con-
sent.35 Many school systems have cheerfully acknowledged that they
disclose student records to third parties more often and more readily
than to students or their parents. 30 In most states, the situation is com-
plicated still further by uncertainty as to whether student records are
"public records," available to anyone. More restrictive rules are now
being adopted in some districts,37 but the assumption from which Pro-
fessor Miller apparently began-that manual record-keeping in the
schools is relatively limited, harmless, and confidential-was and gen-
erally remains false.
Criminal records provide another illustration. Such records are often
incomplete and sometimes inaccurate. Despite numerous statutory and
administrative restrictions, such records are widely available to em-
ployers, private investigators, and newsmen. By contrast, individuals
about whom records are maintained are generally not provided an
opportunity to examine them or challenge their accuracy. Moreover,
few jurisdictions require the destruction of criminal records, even if
the individual arrested was not convicted.38 One misstep, or even the
valid exercise of constitutional rights, may thus leave a severe and per-
manent stain upon an individual's past. Although computers and high
speed transmission facilities 0 undoubtedly make these problems more
urgent and widespread, they did not arrive with the "Age of Cyber-
netics." Indeed, the threat of increasing computerization has, in at least
one respect, proved helpful: It has drawn attention to existing inequi-
ties and stimulated more careful thought about the social policies that
have produced them. For example, at least until the FBI was awarded
control of the forthcoming system for the national exchange of crimi-
34. Goslin & Bordier, supra note 32, at 56.
35. Doe v. McMillan, 459 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3617
(June 26, 1972) (No. 71-6356).
36. Goslin & Bordier, supra note 32, at 56.
37. See, e.g., 14 Del. Laws § 4114 (1970 Supp.); MICH. CoNIP. LAWs § 6002165: WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 885.205 (1969 Supp.); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10751 (West 1972 S upp.). Many of
the recent efforts to devise more systematic rules for handling student records are the
consequence of Russell Sage Foundation, Guidelines for the Collection, Maintenance
and Dissemination of Pupil Records (1970).
38. See, e.g., Irani v. District of Columbia, 292 A.2d 804 (D.C. App. 1972); Spock v.
District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14 (D.C. App. 1971). Compare Anderson v. Sills, V6 .J.
210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970). But see Davidson v. Dill, 41 U.S.L.W. 2284 (Colo. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 13, 1972).
39. The use of such facilities for the exchange of criminal history information was
successfully demonstrated in 1971 by Project SEARCH (System for the Electronic Analysis
and Retrieval of Criminal Histories).
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nal records, there had been a genuine prospect of more rational and
humane rules for the collection and dissemination of such records. 40
I do not completely blame Professor Miller for not writing a lengthy,
perhaps painful, study of such specialized record-keeping problems.
Although progress toward the solution of such problems is likely to be
made only by such discrete studies, there is little interest in such tedi-
ous minutiae. My point is rather that Professor Miller's emphasis on
computerization has caused him to obscure many of the most impor-
tant issues surrounding record-keeping. Limitations upon computeriza-
tion, whether federal or local, comprehensive or particularized, are
likely to prove helpful only if those limitations address the various
social policies implicit in each record-keeping system. Professor Miller's
preoccupation with the gadgetry and excitement of computerization
merely diverts attention from the dreary, unromantic questions of what
kinds of information various organizations should collect, whether the
consent of the individuals involved should be required, how the infor-
mation should be used, and to whom it should be disclosed.
II
Professor Miller's emphasis on the computer might be pardonable,
if nevertheless misleading, if his assessments of the extent and present
consequences of computerization were accurate. There is, however,
important new evidence, based on sources quite different from those
examined by Professor Miller, that now suggests that he has seriously
misjudged those questions. In 1969, the National Academy of Sciences,
with the assistance of the Russell Sage Foundation, began an elaborate
study of computerized data banks. 41 The project, under the direction
of Alan Westin, was designed to obtain empirical evidence on the
extent to which various organizations and agencies, both public and
private, have computerized their files and the consequences for their
record-keeping practices.
40. Until the assignment of the proposed SEARCH system to the FBI, the Security
and Privacy Committee of Project SEARCH had made significant progress tow-ard the
formulation of new standards for the collection, maintenance and dissemination of
criminal history records. In three reports, the Project described elaborate new standards
and offered a model state statute and administrative regulations to implement those
standards. The willingness of the FBI to adhere to such standards has yet to be demon-
strated. A vivid interpretation of these events is provided by Sorkin, The FBI's Big
Brother Computer, 4 WASHINOcON MovrmxY 24 (1972). I should note that I served as
consultant to the Security and Privacy Committee.
41. A. VEsTN & M. BAKER, supra note 31. I served as a member of the study's staff
during the project's latter stages.
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The study began by accumulating what is undoubtedly the largest
single collection of the literature on computerization. The second and
most important stage of the study was a series of elaborate site visits.
Some fifty-five organizations, twenty-nine of them agencies at various
levels of government, were visited by teams of investigators for periods
of one to three days. Banks, insurance companies, an airline, credit-
reporting firms, law enforcement agencies, universities, federal agen-
cies, and religious organizations were all included. Each organization
visited was selected after being judged to be particularly innovative in
computerization or data processing. Almost all of the visits involved
extensive discussions at various levels of the organization, from high
management to the programmers in the computer room. Each visit was
preceded by a careful study of the published materials on the organiza-
tion and its activities. The goal in each situation was to obtain a full
and accurate picture of the organization's record-keeping practices
prior to computerization, the extent to which it had computerized, the
changes that had occurred because of computerization, and the re-
spects in which other changes were expected to occur over the next
several years. The final stage of the study involved a survey of a much
larger number of organizations, designed to gather data against which
to compare the visit results.
The Westin report is too elaborate and detailed to permit a full sum-
mary in a few paragraphs. It is enough for present purposes to sketch
some of the report's principal findings. First, the report demonstrates
that, contrary to the assertions of Professor Miller and others,42 com-
puterization has not caused most organizations to collect more infor-
mation, or more intrusive information, about individuals. Although
new data bases have developed in some areas-elaborate credit card sys-
tems are an excellent illustration-computerization has generally served
merely to provide more expeditious handling of data that were previ-
ously collected. Indeed, since the costs of computerized data handling
are considerable, some organizations have reevaluated their informa-
tion requirements and now collect less, not more, than they did with
manual systems.
43
Second, the study found -that highly sensitive personal data are not
being computerized. Instead, the most objective information-which
usually means the least sensitive and intrusive-has commonly been
computerized. 44 This is, of course, generally not the result of the fas-
42. A. MILLER, PRIVACY at 20-23.
43. A. WESN & M. BAKER, supra note 31, at 420-24.
44. Id. at 424-27.
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tidiousness of data processing managers. It reflects the significance of
processing and conversion costs, and the fact that the computer can
most economically perform high volume, routine processing tasks
which generally involve relatively objective data.
Finally, the report found no evidence to support the usual claim that
computerization, because of coding and increased possibilities of error,
has rendered decision-making more arbitrary and less accurate. Al-
though computer errors are often spectacular and well-publicized, the
study found that computerization generally reduces the frequency of
error and increases the likelihood of correction.45
As a general matter, the evidence collected by the Westin study
strongly suggests that computerization has not yet significantly altered
the extent or character of record-keeping, or the rules by which records
are maintained and used. Despite their flashier dress, data processing
managers are evidently file clerks at heart. I do not mean, and I do not
understand the Westin report to suggest, that computerization does
not demand prompt and careful regulation. The deliberate pace of
computerization, and the relatively modest changes it has produced
thus far, provide time for careful thought, not an excuse for inactivity.
The essential point is rather that computerization must be regulated
merely as a part-and at the moment only a small part-of the wider
problems of record-keeping and information-gathering. It is simply
frivolous to address the means by which record-keeping policies are
implemented, as Professor Miller would evidently have us do, without
first reevaluating those policies themselves.
III
Professor Miller's preoccupation with the computer also muddles
his remedial suggestions. Although he pauses now and again to endorse
specific suggestions for specific problems, he is characteristically im-
patient with "particularistic" devices. His affection instead is reserved
for a new federal agency, which he would have develop an "adminis-
trative privacy scheme for information systems operated by the federal
government, and perhaps those maintained by other organizations." 40
He quite properly recognizes that such a unit would suffer the usual
debilities of administrative agencies, and is sensibly modest about its
immediate potentialities.
45. Id. at 433-56.
46. A. Mumu , PiVACy at 230.
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But Professor Miller is predictably blind to another and more fun.
damental problem. The notion that record-keeping systems are suffi-
ciently similar to permit extensive regulation by a single agency is
plausible only after it has been decided that the problems created by
those systems derive from a single cause-computerization. Once it is
recognized that the computer is responsible for only a small part of
the problem, it becomes plain that Professor Miller is assigning his
agency an impossible hodgepodge of problems. Record-keeping systems
are the embodiment and reflection of the significant activities of our
institutions, both public and private. With few exceptions, the prob-
lems created by record-keeping systems are as disparate as the activities
from which they arise.4 7 Any agency given authority to regulate all col-
lections of information from and about individuals would have been
given, in essence, the authority to control each of those activities.
Whether this is otherwise desirable or not, it should certainly be obvi-
ous that any such agency would immediately encounter extraordinarily
formidable difficulties. At best, Professor Miller's new apparatchiki
would be reduced to the solemn promulgation of meaningless generali-
ties.48 More probably, the result would be chaos on stilts. In either
event, there is no reason to anticipate prompt or effective regulation.
The lamentable truth is that we cannot effectively escape the diffi-
culties of record-keeping either by denunciations of the computer or by
the appointment of a new czar of personal information. Record-keeping
is not one problem but many, and those problems are susceptible to
meaningful solution only by the tedious process of separately analyzing
many disparate issues and circumstances. Professor Miller's oversimpli-
fication both of those problems and of the methods demanded for their
solution has unfortunately obscured an already muddled public debate.
47. Certain minimal due process rights may be applied broadly to systems that collect
and manipulate information about individuals. In particular, there is unquestionably
an immediate need for appropriate guarantees of individual rights of notice, access, and
challenge. But even as to such rights, adequate protection will be provided only after
careful analyses of the specific circumstances and problems of each information-gathering
area have first been conducted.
48. The meaningless rules likely to be promulgated by such an agency are Illustrated
by those laboriously formulated by the PRESIDENT'S CoMMlISSION ON FEDERAL STATIS!rFICS,
1 FEDERAL STATISTICS 9 & 195-218 (1971).
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The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency. By Anthony Platt.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. ix, 230.-$8.50.
Reviewed by J. Lawrence Schultzt
Two authors have recently challenged some long-held assumptions
about the origins of juvenile courts. In complementary publications
sociologist Anthony Platt' and law professor Sanford Fox2 attempt to
debunk conventional historical wisdom and to show that middle-class
interests motivated reformers who wrote the first juvenile court act in
1899. Their analysis bears importantly on current efforts to reform our
juvenile justice system.
I
The focus of both Platt and Fox is the Illinois "Juvenile Court Act"
of 1899.3 The Act included provisions for protecting children other
than those involved in court proceedings, 4 but the features that gained
national attention were those governing the adjudication and disposi-
tion of children under sixteen who were either "dependent and ne-
glected" or "delinquent." 5 The innovative characteristics included: the
designation of one circuit judge in Cook County to hear all cases under
the Act0 in a special, separate courtroom 7 in a summary proceeding;"
the separation of children from adult convicts confined in the same
institution;9 and the prohibition against confining a child under twelve
j- Co-director, Juvenile Justice Standards Project, New York University. B.A. 1967, Yale
University; J.D. 1970, Harvard University.
1. A. PLArr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INvErtmox OF DINQquENcV (1969).
2. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. RFv. 1187 (1970).
3. Law of April 21, 1899, [1899] Ill. Laws 131.
4. The Act provided for inspection of and annual reporting by foster homes, in-
stitutions, and private associations to whom children would be referred under the Act.
Id. §§ 12-14, 18 at 135. It also regulated the placement of dependent, neglected, and
delinquent children from other states to private agencies in Illinois. Id. § 16 at 136.
5. Delinquents more than ten years of age, unlike dependent and neglected children,
could be committed to the state reformatory or Home for Juvenile Female Offenders.
or could be placed in a foster home, a state training school, or some accredited private
institution. Id. §§ 7, 9.
6. Id. § 3, at 132 (the statute by its terms applied to all counties having a popula.
tion over 500,000; in 1899 and for some time thereafter, only Cook County was in this
category).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 5. Other procedural aspects of the Act are worth noting. "Any reputable
person" who in a petition alleged facts sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction
could initiate a proceeding. Id. § 4. This typical provision, repeated in the acts of
other states, has contributed to the image of all juvenile proceedings-including those
alleging the commission of a crime-as "civil" in nature. Section 2 of the Act permitted
"any person interested" to demand trial of any case brought under the Act by a
"jury of six."
9. Id. § 11, at 135.
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in a jail or police station. 10 The new court was authorized to appoint
probation officers to investigate cases, represent the interests of the
child during his hearing, and supervise children placed on probation. 1
As important as any of these specific provisions was the general pur-
pose clause:
That the care, custody, and discipline of a child shall approxi-
mate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents,
and in all cases where it can properly be done the child be placed
in an improved family home and become a member of the family
by legal adoption or otherwise.
12
Significant amendments in 1901,13 1905,14 and 190715 expanded the
definition of juvenile delinquency,' regulated more closely the quality
of treatment accorded juveniles,' 7 and increased public funding for the
probation system.'
8
Earlier writers extolled the central philosophy of the Illinois legis-
lation as "revolutionary"' 9 or "radically new. ' 20 Professors Platt and
Fox disagree. Although their interpretations differ, each concludes that
the 1899 legislation served primarily middle-class interests and pro-
duced no important innovations in either concept or detail.
2 1
Platt analyzes intellectual trends which dominated criminal and
10. Id.
11. Id. §§ 6, 9, at 133.
12. Id. § 21, at 137.
13. Act of May 11, 1901, [1901] IIl. Laws 141.
14. Act of May 11, 1905, [1905] Ill. Laws 151.
15. Act of June 4, 1907, [1907] 111. Laws 70.
16. The 1901 law broadened "delinquency" to include both peculiarly juvenile
offenses (e.g., frequenting saloons) and the apparently all-encompassing "status" of-
fenses of incorrigibility and "growing up in idleness or crime." Act of May 11, 1901,
2, [1901] I. Laws 142. The 1907 law expanded "juvenile" offenses to Include,
inter alia, running away from home, loitering, and using profanity. Act of June 4,
1907, § 2 [1], [1907] Ill. Laws 76.
17. The 1901 law established a procedure requirin5 the Board of State Commls-
sioners of Public Charities to certify annually the "fitness" of institutions receiving
juveniles under the Act, and prohibited commitment of children to institutions not
approved by the agency. Act of May€ 11, 1901, § 13 [1901], 111. Laws 143. In 1907, legis-
lation gave the court authority to rnquire into the treatment accorded any adjudicated
juvenile, and to remove children from unsatisfactory institutions. Act of June 4, 1907,
§ 9e, [1907] II. Laws 77. It also permitted the court to return a committed juvenileto his home, if it were found unsuitable. Id. § 9d.
18. The 1905 amendment provided public compensation from county funds for
probation officers in Cook County. See note 6 supra. Act of May 13, 1905, § 6, [1905]
Ill Laws 151. The 1907 amendment provided for compensation for all probation of-
ficers, regardless of county population. Act of April 19, 1907, § 6, [1907] 111. Laws 69.
19. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problens of Function
and Form, 1965 Wis. L. Rav. 7.
20. Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUbt. L. REV. 281
(1967). However, Judge Julian Mack of the Chicago Juvenile Court saw "nothing radi-
cally new" in probation or any other feature of the Act. Mack, The Juvenile Coturt,
23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 116 (1909). See note 29 infra.
21. See Platt, supra note 1, at 134-36; Fox, supra note 2, at 1229-30.
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penal reform in the nineteenth century and which were reflected in
the act.22 Paramount among the middle-class biases he finds embodied
in the legislation was hostility to the cities, to the new waves of immi-
grants, and even to their children, whom the reformers professedly
wished to save from criminality and immorality.2 3
In his recent Stanford Law Review article, Fox concentrates on two
themes: First, he contends that two important provisions of the Act-
summary proceedings and a bias in favor of treatment modeled on fam-
ily life-reflected conservative attitudes common in the nineteenth cen-
tury.24 Second, he contends, as does Platt, that in important respects the
1899 Act represented a failure for the reformers, who were defeated in
efforts they themselves held important: improving conditions of incar-
ceration2 5 and severing public treatment of children from the influ-
ence of sectarian organizations.-(
II
Generally, although their effort to correct exaggerated claims made
for the 1899 Act is valid and valuable, Platt and Fox seem to overstate
the claims made by the reformers themselves. Both authors trace the
antecedents of the important features of the Illinois Act,2 T including
separate confinement of children for minor offenses and the use of
probation,28 to other states. But most responsible commentators and
reformers did not contend that such provisions were unique or origi-
nal.29 Their claim, rather, was that these elements had been combined
for the first time in a single act which explicitly committed the state
to the approach of treating children who broke the law as children
22. Platt, supra note 1, at 15-100.
23. Id. at 36-43 & 135-36.
24. Fox, supra note 1, at 1207-15.
25. Id. at 1222-24.
26. Id. at 1228-29.
27. Platt, supra note 1, at 15-100; Fox, supra note 2, at 1188-1222. For a concise survcy
of the legal history, see TAms FoRcE ON JUVENiLE DELrNquENcy, ThE PREsIDEN T'S COM-
MISMION ON LAW ENFORCUIENT AND ADMINISTRATioN OF JusricE, TAsx FORCE REIOr
JUVENILE DELINQUExCY AND YOUTH CRIMi 24 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK ForcE
REPORT]. See also 4 W. BLAcKsToNE, Co6s.NFNTARaEs 021-22.
28. Platt, supra note 1, at 108-09; Fox, supra note 2, at 1189. For a description of
probation in late nineteenth century Massachusetts, see J. HAwES, CHILEN IN URDA.
SocIETy: JUVENILE DEuNQUENCY IN NIrrErats-C.MuRy A. si.uA 174-77 (1971).
29. See Barrows, Introduction to IN1ERNATIONAL PRIsoN CoNI.nssIoN, CIIILDE,'S
COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THEIR ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND REsULTS, H.R. Doc.
No. 701, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. x-xi (1904) [hereinafter cited as CmiLDaEN's CouRTS].
Barrows stressed the continuity of development of institutions and laws as did other
contributors. See Eliot, The Change Wrought by the Juvenile Probation System in St.
Louis, id. at 10-11; Mack, supra note 20, at 116; Murphy, History of the Juvenile Court
of Buffalo, in CmLRFEN'S COURTS 10-11.
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with problems rather than as criminals.30 Some of the authors' specific
interpretations are also vulnerable.
Coercion and Middle-Class Values. Platt and Fox are correct in their
central contention that the Act continued the older system of "coer-
cive" treatment for dependent and delinquent children31 : that is, the
juvenile court could assess fines, impose probation, and forcibly re-
move children from their homes. Platt is open to challenge, however,
in his further assertion that the Act expanded the scope of government
interference in children's lives because it authorized punishment for
status and other vaguely defined offenses which were offenses only
for children.32 Platt's own findings indicate that punishment for such
crimes pre-dated the Act. Thus in 1867, children could be committed
to indeterminate sentences in the State Reform School for being "des-
titute of proper parental care, or growing up in mendicancy, ignorance,
idleness or vice." 33 Before the Act's adoption children were also sys-
tematically committed to adult jails for "disorderly conduct," a charge
that could apparently encompass any act that might later have served
as a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction.3 4 Rather than expand state
power the Act may have only consolidated authority previously held by
other state and local agencies.
The Act's consolidation of existing power had an impact on all as-
pects of child care. One of its effects may have been some reduction in
the number of children in penal institutions.3 5 On the other hand,
30. Law of April 21, 1899, § 11, [1899] Ill. Laws 135.
31. Platt, supra note 1, at 134-35; Fox, supra note 2, at 1229.
32. Platt, supra note 1, at 3-4, 6 & 137.
33. Id. at 103.
34. From the first of January, 1899, when the legislature met which enacted the
measure popularly known as the Juvenile Court law, until the first of July, 1899,
when that law went into effect, 322 boys between the ages of nine and sixteen
years were sent to the city prison. Three hundred and twenty of them were sent
up on the blanket charge of disorderly conduct, which covered offenses from
burglary and assault with a deadly weapon to picking up coal in the railway
tracks, building bonfires, playing ball in the street, or "flipping trains," that Is,
jumping on and off moving trains.
Lathrop, Introduction to S. BRECKENRIDGE & E. ABBoTT, TinE DELINQUENT CHILD AND
THE HOME 2 (1912).
35. Of 1,301 alleged delinquents brought before Judge Tuthill in Chicago between
February 1 and November 1, 1903, more than half (715) were placed on probation; 505
were sentenced to the John Worthy School, 58 cases were dismissed, 17 were sentenced
to other courts, and 6 were placed in institution for dependents. Of the 505 children
placed in the School, 467 were children who had previously been before the court
at least once and 141 had been there at least twice. Thus, only about 38 children were
placed in the School as a result of their delinquency petition. Tuthill, History of tie
Children's Court in Chicago, in CHILDREN'S COURTS, supra note 29, at 6.
Similarly, the first two years under the original juvenile court act in Denver, of 554
children placed on probation, 5.5 per cent were subsequently committed to a training
school. Of those brought to juvenile court on delinquency petitions, only ten per cent
were initially sentenced to the schools, as compared to seventy-five per cent of those
children who had appeared in criminal court prior to the 1903 law. Lindsey, The
Juvenile Courts of Denver, id. at 33.
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various reforms such as probation may also have permitted states to
assume some control over more children and for longer periods of
time.30 Empirical evidence of what actually happened to children be-
fore and after the passage of juvenile court acts is essential to answering
these questions; the authors provide none and there may in fact be
none.
Both Platt and Fox also fail to support their argument that the
juvenile court system, because it was coercive, served only middle-class
interests and values.37 There is evidence to suggest, on the contrary, that
immig-rants, racial minorities and poor parents may have welcomed an
expansion of state police power as a means of controlling ungovernable
children, relieving the burdens of under-financed child-rearing and
restoring order to turbulent neighborhoods.38 In fact, parents often
availed themselves of the courts' broad jurisdiction to discipline or rid
themselves of their own children.
30
Detention. The authors contend that the reformers failed to segre-
gate children from adults pending final court action-a goal they con-
sidered crucial to juvenile justice-because the legislature did not pro-
vide funds for a new juvenile detention home.40 But they ignore the
supplementary role of private charitable organizations. 41 Where pub-
lic money fell short, private funds traditionally made up the difference;
although no publicly supported facility was built under the 1899 law,
children were separately housed in a building provided by a prisoner's
aid society, and others were lodged in a county hospital.42
Probation. Both authors' analysis is further weakened by an unjus-
tifiable failure to discuss the significance of probation.43 Reformers,
judges, and early probation officers in Illinois and throughout the
country considered probation the most important element of the first
juvenile court acts.44 Following the 1899 Act, probation spread to every
36. See, e.g., Tuthill, supra note 35, at 4; he states that it was his practice to place
every child charged with delinquency "under the care of a probation officer" and to
allow him to return home.
37. Platt, supra note 1, at 134-36; Fox, supra note 2, at 1193-95.
38. For discussion of views of immigrant parents, see N. GLAZER & D. MoYsNtAt ,
BEYOND THE MELTING POT 124-25, 195; 0. "kNDLIN, TIlE UPROOTED 254 (1951).
39. Wilkin, History of the Children's Court, Borough of Broohlyn, City of New
York, in CHILDR.N,'s COURTS, supra note 29, at 26.
40. Platt, supra note 1, at 146-47; Fox, supra note 2, at 1224.
41. Although both Platt and Fox emphasize the vital role of private organizations
in securing passage of the Act, they underestimate their importance in effecting its pro-
visions. See Platt, supra note 1, at 134-36, 175; Fox, supra note 2, at 1229-31.
42. See Kelsey, The Juvenile Court of Chicago and Its Work, 17 ANNAts 293, 301 (1901).
43. Fox, supra note 2, at 1229, dismisses probation as a "token" and "of little assistance."
44. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 29, at 13, describing probation as "the keystone of
the system." Another reformer stated: "The success of the s)Stem would depend prin-
cipally on the character of the probation work that was provided .... " Schoff, A
Campaign for Childhood, id. at 138. See also Eliot, id. at 162.
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state which enacted juvenile court legislation.45 Probation proved criti-
cal for juvenile justice reform because it permitted judges to extend
their knowledge and dispositional authority beyond the courthouse.
It gave the judge an attractive middle road between incarceration and
release by permitting supervision of children in their homes.
The 1899 Act did not provide funds for probation officers, 40 but in
fact officers were employed soon after passage of the Act, and paid by
private organizations. 47 By 1905, probation officers in Cook County4 -
and by 1907, 49 all Illinois probation officers-were paid by the state.
Procedures. Second in importance only to probation were the "sum-
mary" procedures mandated by the 1899 Act and its progeny. Fox sug-
gests that procedural informality was not innovative because children
had been dealt with "informally" before-namely, in lower municipal
courts.50 He justifiably surmises that before 1899 children tried for
crimes were routinely processed with little respect for civil liberties.61
But the informality of court procedures under the Act was far dif-
ferent from that in Chicago municipal court.5 2 Children in juvenile
court had probation officers charged to represent their interests;" they
also enjoyed a statutory right to a jury trial in every case, 4 and the
benefit of apparently well qualified judges." Indeed, there is evidence
that a major impetus to reform was a desire to make procedures less
informal-less hurried and more individualized-by giving the court
time and manpower to conduct a full investigation of each case and
thus to spare children from the sloppy, assembly-line procedures of
lower courts.56 Providing a non-adversial forum, moreover, was at most
45. H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATEs 24-25 (1927).
46. See Law of April 21, 1899, [1899] Ill. Laws 181.
47. By the end of its first year of operation, the Chicago court had six probation
officers supported by the Juvenile Court Committee of the Chicago Women's Club,
Platt, supra note 1, at 139-40. By 1904, fifteen policemen served as probation officers;
ten to fifteen women officers were supported by the Women's Club; and several others
were furnished by private philanthropists. See Tuthill, supra note 35, at 4.
48. See Act of May 13, 1905, [1905] Ill. Laws 151.
49. See Act of April 19, 1907, [1907] Ill. Laws 69.
50. Fox, supra note 2, at 1222.
51. Id. at 1212-13.
52. See Tuthill, supra note 35, at 3-4; Kelsey, supra note 42, at 302.04.
53. Act of April 21, 1899, § 6, [1899] Ill. Laws 133.
54. Id., § 2, pt. 132; nonetheless this provision was probably seldom used.
55. Richard S. Tuthill had fifteen years' experience on the bench before becoming
the first juvenile court judge in Chicago. Platt, supra note 1, at 141. He was sutceedcd
by Julian W. Mack. Hawes, supra note 45, at 183.
56. A probation officer complained of children having been treated in the "flippant
manner that usually characterizes proceedings in the police courts of our large cities."
Hall, History of the Juvenile Court of Milwaukee, in CHILDREN'S CouRTs, supra note 29,
at 144. A reformer stated that before reform:
Any magistrate could commit a child to a reformatory on the parent's statement
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a subsidiary aim. Most reformers were far more impressed with the
need to improve corrections and treatment programs. 7
III
Of what present significance is the history of the juvenile justice
system? The history of juvenile court procedure bears directly on the
current debate about whether more stringent rules of due process
ought to be applied to juvenile courts. Those who argue for greater
informality of procedure often rely on the contention that this was the
reformers' original objective, and that informality is therefore in the
reformist tradition.58 Such is the interpretation of history presented by
Platt.59 But, as shown above, few reformers considered procedural infor-
mality important to the juvenile courts, and many intended to increase
procedural formality.
60
One argument for procedural informality has been that the juvenile
court process may itself be therapeutic if restrictive due process safe-
guards are not imposed; for example, the juvenile may be coaxed into
admission and repentence of wrongdoing. 1 This argument, however,
tends to confuse correction and treatment, on the one hand, with pro-
cedures leading to these dispositions, on the other. Misuse of the argu-
ment is illustrated by a recent decision of the Second Circuit relying
on the idea that juvenile court procedures may be therapeutic in order
to deny a juvenile the right to jury trial (although he could be com-
mitted, and was in fact committed, to an adult prison).02
of incorrigibility, and no effort was ever made to prove the parent's statement.
The child's side of the case was never heard.
Schoff, supra note 44, at 134-35.
57. Judge Lindsey expressed faith in the efficacy of reform schools and industrial
schools. Lindsey, supra note 35, at 29-30.
58. The early reformers were appalled by adult criminal procedures and penalties
.... The child-essentially good, as they saw it-was to be made "to feel that he is the
object of [the state's] care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or on trial.
The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable (footnote
omitted).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 at 15 (1966).
59. Platt, supra note 1, at 141-45.
60. See p. 634; but see Fox, supra note 2, at 1221-22.
61. See, e.g., Lindsey, supra note 57, at 108-09; Mack, supra note 20, at 120.
62. As indicated above, we believe that the Supreme Court in McKeiver coun-
tenanced the juvenile court system for the benefits it confers on juveniles apart
from those arising after disposition. An informal proceeding informed by sym-
pathy and concern was itself considered sufficiently desirable and still attainable
to outweigh the argument in favor of jury trials (emphasis added).
United States ex rel. Murray v. Owens, Nos. 72-1474, 72-1514 at 4346-47 (2d Cir. August
10, 1972). The view that less procedural "formality" leaves courts more flexible in treating
children was voiced in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1971), holding
that there is no Fourteenth Amendment right to a jury trial in juvenile delinquency
cases.
The Yale Law Journal
Informal procedures have recently been defended by others as a
quid pro quo for the government's promise to help the child (e.g., the
child will not be stigmatized; the family will be strengthened; children
who must be removed from their homes will be placed in other homes
or in family-like institutions). 3 But if, according to this view, such
benefits are not forthcoming, and the "contract" in effect is breached,
then the procedural safeguards must be restored. 4 A full assessment of
this theory is not possible here, except to note an important objection:
it makes the granting of procedural rights contingent upon a judge's
ad hoc decision that a particular disposition is bad for a child.0 5
Both Platt and Fox share the skeptical view of present juvenile courts
expounded by advocates of a current liberal agenda, exemplified by
the final recommendations of the President's Crime Commission in
1967.00 This agenda continues to assign the state a major role in solv-
ing the problems of delinquents. Its essential features include (1) en.
couraging reliance by social service workers, police, teachers and par-
ents on youth service programs before resort to juvenile courts (with-
out restricting the juvenile courts' jurisdiction)07 and (2) transferring
children from big, coercive institutions into smaller, "community-
based" facilities.
0 8
As an alternative to this liberal agenda, another program for reform
stresses minimum interference in children's lives as a goal. This pro-
gram advocates: (1) Repealing laws defining crimes in terms of chil-
dren's status ("incorrigible" and the like) or in terms of behavior which
would be illegal only for children (truancy); 0 and (2) committing
juveniles to brief, determinate terms of confinement. 70 Supporters of
this program thus resist many of the impulses toward "child-saving"
63. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-21 (1966).
64. Id.
65. Fox questions whether granting procedural rights on this basis may not lead
to rescinding child welfare programs without providing adequate funds for counsel.
Fox, supra note 2, at 1238-39.
66. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 79.87 (1967).
67. See Gough, Consent Decrees and Informal Service in the Juvenile Court: Excur.
sions Toward Balance, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 733-38 (1971).
68. See 0. KELLER & B. ALPER, HALFWAY HousEs: COMMUNITY-CENTERED CORRECTION
AND TREATMENT 106-17 (1970); Kovach, Massachusetts Reforms to Doom Youth Prisons$,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1972, at 37, col. 3.
69. See Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (1971), aff'd mem,, 406 U.S. 913 (1972),
holding the New York "Wayward Minor" Act unconstitutional; TASK FORCE REI'ORT,
supra note 27, at 27; Glen, Juvenile Court Reform: Procedural Process and Substantive
Stasis, 1970 Wis. L. Rav. 431, 441-47.
70. See AMRUCAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITrEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 40-47, 83-99 (1970).
But see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 5.
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that led to the 1899 law7 ' and sustain juvenile courts today. The pro-
gram's danger is that behavior left unpunished by the state, but so-
cially disapproved, may be punished by teachers, police, or parents as
arbitrarily and destructively as by the worst juvenile courts. In the pre-
vailing atmosphere of skepticism about juvenile courts, the most im-
pressive justifications for new approaches emphasizing voluntariness
are that they are cheaper and preserve children's autonomy.
Why is it important as the reformers claimed, that the state handle
children who violate laws as children with problems rather than as
criminals? Three final observations of the impact of juvenile reform,
past and potential, can be made: First, children seem better off in
juvenile courts than in adult criminal courts. This is because children's
prisons-are generally not as bad as adult prisons; because fewer children
than adults are incarcerated, for shorter periods of time; and because a
juvenile court faces less resistance in placing even serious offenders in
foster homes, drug programs, or probation."
Second, the existence of a system committed to treatment rather than
punishment has encouraged innovation. For example, probation was
adapted from juvenile courts to the adult system." More recently,
Massachusetts' energetic Commissioner of Youth Services, Dr. Jerome
Miller, in closing that state's largest institutions for delinquents, may
have paved the ground for adult penal reform.74
Finally, the general purpose clause authorizing juvenile courts to
use family treatment has provided a rationale for implementing a
"right to treatment," which otherwise must be pegged to more cum-
bersome constitutional doctrines. 5 To the extent that courts are will-
ing to impose spending obligations on legislatures to implement this
right, general purpose clauses may yet provide a way to realize some of
71. A Philadelphia reformer expressed an attitude typical of many reformers:
In the light of true values no cases coming into the courts equal in importance
to the community and the State these children's cases. The treatment giren at this
time will decide whether he shall become a good citizen or a criminal ....
Should not the State safeguard the interests of its helpless citizens and provide
adequately and wisely for their development physically, morally, and intellectually?
Schoff, supra note 44, at 136.
72. As trying as are the problems of the juvenile courts, the problems of the
criminal courts, particularly those of the lower courts that would fall heir to much
of the juvenile court jurisdiction, are even graver ....
PRESIDENT's COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORC-EET AND ADMINI"ATION OF JusncE, Tim
CHALL NGE OF CIUME IN A FRE Socm'ry 81 (1967).
73. See p. 634.
74. Kovach, supra note 68; Kovach, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1972, at 21. col. 3.
75. See United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.C.D.C. 1971); Gough, The
Beyond-Control Child and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of
Paradox, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 182 (1971); 16 ST. Louts U.L.J. 340 (1971).
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the promise of the original acts.71 That the advocates of reform aspired
to more is doubtful; that they secured this much, at least, must moder-
ate present-day cynicism.
76. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
supplementing 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The court, per Johnson, C. J., held
that failure to comply with a court order to provide patients at three state mental In-
stitutions with the minimum medical and constitutional requisites of treatment could
not be justified by lack of funds. The court said:
In the event . . . that the Legislature fails to satisfy its well-defined constitutional
obligation, and the Mental Health Board, because of lack of funding or any other
legally insufficient reason, fails to implement fully the standards herein ordered,
it will be necessary for the Court to take affirmative steps, including appointing a
master, to ensure that proper funding is realized and that adequate treatment
is available for the mentally ill of Alabama [footnote omitted].
344 F. Supp. at 378.
